Existential Minimalism: A Philosophy of Strategic Disengagement

The Fundamental Imposition

Human existence begins with an act of cosmic injustice. We are brought into being without our consent by individuals acting on biological imperatives they neither fully understand nor control. Our parents, driven by evolutionary programming disguised as love, desire, or social expectation, make a unilateral decision that commits us to decades of consciousness, struggle, and eventual death. This is not a gift but an imposition—life as hassle rather than opportunity.

The impossibility of obtaining consent from pre-conscious entities is precisely the ethical problem: we create conscious beings who will inevitably develop preferences, desires, and the capacity for suffering without being able to consult those future preferences. The asymmetry is fundamental—those who make the decision to create life bear none of its consequences, while those who bear the consequences had no voice in the decision. This represents a unique form of temporal injustice that other ethical frameworks struggle to address.

Traditional philosophy has long grappled with the question of why we exist, but rarely confronts the more pointed question of whether we should have been made to exist at all. While anti-natalist philosophers have begun to address this question, they typically focus on preventing future births rather than addressing what those already alive should do with their unwanted existence.

The biological imperative that produces new humans operates independently of any consideration for the welfare of those humans. Evolution selects for reproduction, not happiness, meaning, or consent. We are the products of a blind process that creates conscious beings capable of suffering without consulting them about their preferences.

This reality forms the cornerstone of what I propose to call existential minimalism: a philosophical framework that begins with the recognition of existence as an unwanted imposition and proceeds to develop rational strategies for managing this predicament.

The Problem with Traditional Responses

When confronted with life’s involuntary nature, most philosophical traditions offer responses that compound rather than alleviate the original imposition. Rather than acknowledging the fundamental problem—that we never consented to exist—these approaches demand additional engagement with existence itself.

Existentialism, as exemplified by Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, demands that we create meaning from meaninglessness, essentially asking us to work harder at the very thing we never asked for. The absurdists, following Albert Camus, suggest we embrace the contradiction with rebellious joy—again, requiring additional emotional labour. Religious frameworks promise eventual compensation for present suffering, but still insist we actively participate in systems we never chose. Even nihilism, while recognizing the absence of inherent meaning, often wallows in despair or embraces destruction, both of which require considerable energy expenditure.

These approaches share a common flaw: they assume engagement is mandatory and that some form of active response to existence is required. Existential minimalism rejects this assumption entirely, proposing instead strategic disengagement as the most rational response to unwanted existence.

The widespread acceptance of life as meaningful or worthwhile often requires significant psychological and social conditioning that obscures the fundamental asymmetry of our situation. We are taught from birth to be grateful for existence, to find purpose and meaning, and to contribute to the continuation of the cycle—all without ever being asked whether we wanted to participate in the first place.

The Principle of Energy Conservation

Existential minimalism proposes a different approach: if life is an unwanted imposition, the rational response is to minimize the energy required to manage it. This is not depression, which involves significant psychological suffering and often requires substantial effort to maintain. Nor is it suicide, which merely exchanges one form of energy expenditure for another and carries its own set of complications and potential consequences for others.

Instead, existential minimalism advocates for what might be called “existential hibernation”—a practical application of the core principle that involves strategic minimal engagement designed to reduce the friction of unwanted existence while avoiding the additional complications that come from either total withdrawal or enthusiastic participation.

The guiding principle operates on two levels: as a pragmatic strategy for reducing daily friction, and as an ethical framework that minimizes harm to oneself and others. Since we cannot undo the original imposition of existence, the most responsible approach is to manage it with maximum efficiency and minimum waste—of energy, resources, and impact on others who find themselves in the same unwanted predicament.

This ethical framework prioritizes harm reduction over positive outcomes, aligning with negative utilitarian principles that focus on minimizing suffering rather than maximizing happiness. However, it differs from traditional negative utilitarianism by emphasizing individual energy conservation rather than collective welfare maximization.

Practical Implementation: The Urban Hermitage

Pure withdrawal from society is neither possible nor desirable, as it typically requires more energy than selective engagement. Complete isolation leads to problems with basic needs, healthcare, legal compliance, and social intervention from concerned parties. The goal is not maximum withdrawal but optimal withdrawal—finding the minimum viable participation that keeps external systems satisfied while preserving maximum personal autonomy.

The urban hermitage represents the practical implementation of existential minimalist principles—a lifestyle configuration that applies the core philosophy to daily existence:

Economic Minimalism: Remote work eliminates commuting, office politics, and forced social interaction while providing the income necessary to maintain independence. The goal is not career advancement or professional fulfilment, but simply earning enough to avoid financial pressures that would require additional engagement.

Social Minimalism: Human relationships, while occasionally pleasant, are fundamentally unpredictable and energy-intensive. They require emotional labour, schedule coordination, reciprocal obligations, and constant negotiation. Most social benefits can be obtained through books, which provide access to interesting minds without the maintenance requirements of living relationships.

Consumption Minimalism: Basic needs can be met with remarkable efficiency. Grocery delivery or brief shopping trips handle nutrition. Digital entertainment eliminates the need for social venues. Simple living spaces require minimal maintenance. The goal is not ascetic purity but practical efficiency.

Stimulation Minimalism: The human brain requires some form of engagement to prevent the discomfort of boredom, but this can be satisfied through solitary activities that align with one’s particular neurological configuration. Reading, writing, creative work, or any other mentally engaging pursuit serves this function without requiring external validation or social participation.

The Role of Creative Output

Many individuals who adopt this approach find themselves producing creative work—writing, art, music, or other forms of expression. This might seem to contradict the principle of minimal engagement, but it actually supports it in several ways.

First, creative activity functions as mental maintenance, providing the stimulation necessary to prevent psychological discomfort while requiring no external participation. It is a form of internal dialogue that keeps the mind occupied without creating social obligations.

Second, creative work often emerges naturally from particular neurological configurations. Some brains produce poems or stories the way others produce anxiety or repetitive thoughts. Attempting to suppress this natural output would require more energy than simply allowing it to occur.

Third, the value or reception of creative work is irrelevant to its function within existential minimalism. Whether anyone reads the poems, views the art, or listens to the music has no bearing on its utility as mental occupation. The work serves its purpose simply by existing, not by achieving recognition or influence.

This explains why someone following this approach might publish their work online despite minimal readership. The act of publication requires little additional effort while satisfying whatever residual social impulses remain, but the lack of audience neither surprises nor disappoints. The work was never intended to change the world or achieve immortality—it was simply what the brain did while passing time.

Digital Impermanence and the Literary Will

Traditional approaches to legacy reflect an anxiety about mortality that existential minimalism considers misplaced. The desire to be remembered, to leave a lasting impact, to achieve some form of immortality through work or relationships—these represent additional forms of energy expenditure that serve no practical purpose for the individual who will not exist to appreciate them.

Digital platforms offer an elegant solution to this problem. By creating work in electronic formats hosted by third parties, someone practising this philosophy avoids the decision-making burden of legacy management. When the individual dies, the hosting fees go unpaid, and the work disappears naturally. No relatives need decide what to preserve, no estates need management, no publishers need to be contacted. The work simply fades away along with its creator.

For those who adopt this approach and wish to handle the unlikely possibility that someone might want access to their work after their death, a Creative Commons declaration serves as a minimal-effort solution. It costs nothing to implement and removes legal barriers for anyone who might encounter the work through archived formats, but it requires no active management or decision-making by others.

This approach to creative legacy embodies existential minimalist principles: acknowledge the most probable outcome (disappearance), prepare for unlikely alternatives with minimal effort (open licensing), but avoid investing emotional energy in outcomes you will not be present to experience.

Distinguishing from Related Philosophies

Existential minimalism differs from several superficially similar approaches:

Depression: While both involve withdrawal from social engagement, depression typically includes significant psychological suffering, negative self-judgment, and impaired functioning. Existential minimalism is a strategic choice made from a position of clarity about life’s nature, not a symptom of psychological dysfunction.

Traditional Asceticism: Religious and philosophical traditions of withdrawal—from Buddhist monasticism to Christian hermitage to the philosophical retreat advocated by Epictetus and other Stoics—typically aim toward spiritual enlightenment, moral purification, or transcendent understanding. Existential minimalism seeks none of these goals—it is purely practical, aimed at reducing friction rather than achieving higher states.

Nihilistic Destruction: While nihilism recognizes the absence of inherent meaning, it often manifests as destructive behaviour toward self or others. Friedrich Nietzsche, though often misunderstood as advocating nihilism, actually warned against its destructive potential. Existential minimalism is constructive in its approach, seeking to minimize harm rather than maximize it.

Hedonistic Withdrawal: Some forms of disengagement focus on maximizing pleasure through drugs, entertainment, or other forms of stimulation. This approach is ultimately futile, as even the greatest pleasures fade and require increasingly intense stimulation to maintain the same effect. Those who pursue this path typically either destroy themselves physically and emotionally through escalation, or fall into depression when the diminishing returns become undeniable. Existential minimalism avoids this trap by neither pursuing pleasure actively nor depending on it for psychological stability, recognizing that pleasure-seeking often requires energy expenditure that defeats the purpose of minimal engagement.

Ethical Framework and Its Limits

The ethical framework of existential minimalism centres on energy efficiency and harm minimization, but this raises important questions about its practical limits and potential contradictions. When does minimizing one’s own energy expenditure conflict with minimizing harm to others?

The framework addresses this tension through a principle of proportional responsibility: since we are all unwilling participants in the same imposed existence, we owe each other basic consideration but not self-sacrifice. The goal is to minimize aggregate friction while avoiding actions that would force others into higher-energy responses.

For example, maintaining minimal social courtesies and legal compliance prevents others from having to deal with the consequences of our complete withdrawal, which would increase their energy expenditure. Conversely, we are not obligated to engage in emotional labour or social performance that others might prefer but which requires significant energy from us.

This creates a kind of “social efficiency equilibrium” where everyone’s energy expenditure is minimized through predictable, low-maintenance interactions rather than through one person bearing the cost of another’s complete disengagement.

The framework acknowledges that different individuals will have different baseline energy requirements and different tolerance for various forms of engagement. What matters is not achieving identical lifestyles but rather each person finding their own optimal balance point between energy conservation and social friction avoidance.

Philosophical Implications

Existential minimalism suggests several broader philosophical insights:

Consent and Temporal Justice: The involuntary nature of existence raises questions about the ethics of reproduction that most philosophical traditions avoid confronting directly. Anti-natalists like David Benatar and Thomas Metzinger have addressed this directly, arguing that bringing new conscious beings into existence is ethically problematic due to the inevitable suffering it entails. Existential minimalism extends this insight by recognizing that the inability to obtain meaningful consent from potential future consciousness represents a fundamental form of temporal injustice—those making reproductive decisions bear none of the consequences while imposing all of them on others. While anti-natalism focuses primarily on preventing future births, existential minimalism addresses the complementary question of how those already alive should manage their unwanted existence.

Energy as Ethical Framework: Rather than evaluating actions based on duty, consequences, or virtue, existential minimalism evaluates them based on energy efficiency relative to unavoidable requirements. This provides both a practical metric for decision-making and an ethical stance: since we are all trapped in the same unwanted predicament, the most responsible approach is to minimize the harm we cause to ourselves and others through inefficient engagement with systems we never chose to join.

Counter-Existentialism: While traditional existentialists like Camus and Sartre argued we are “condemned to be free” and thus have a duty to create meaning and live authentically, existential minimalism represents a form of counter-existentialism. It accepts the premise of a meaningless, absurd universe but draws the opposite conclusion—one of strategic withdrawal rather than defiant engagement. If we are unconsenting participants in existence, our primary obligation is not to create meaning but to minimize the energy required to manage our unwanted participation.

Temporal Perspective: Most philosophies assume that life extends far enough into the future to justify long-term projects, relationship-building, or meaning-creation. Existential minimalism maintains a shorter temporal focus, planning only as far ahead as necessary to maintain basic functioning while avoiding investments in outcomes that require sustained engagement over extended periods.

Social Contract Revision: The social contract assumes willing participation in collective endeavours. Existential minimalism suggests that minimal compliance with social requirements, rather than enthusiastic participation, represents a more honest relationship with systems we never chose to join.

Conclusion: The Ethics of Minimal Harm

Existential minimalism is not a philosophy of despair but of practical wisdom. It acknowledges that since we cannot undo the imposition of existence, we can at least manage it efficiently. By reducing our energy expenditure to the minimum necessary for basic functioning, we honour the reality that we never asked to be here while avoiding the additional suffering that comes from either fighting this reality or pretending to embrace it enthusiastically.

This approach may seem cold or nihilistic to those who have convinced themselves that life is inherently meaningful, but it offers something valuable: honesty about the human condition and a practical framework for managing unwanted existence without causing additional harm to ourselves or others. It recognizes that many people do find life worthwhile, but argues that this often requires significant psychological and social conditioning to overlook the fundamental asymmetry of our situation.

The existential minimalist neither advocates for nor condemns existence—it simply manages the situation with maximal efficiency and minimal waste. In a universe that imposed consciousness upon us without our permission, this may be the most ethical response available: to live quietly, consume little, create what emerges naturally, and leave behind as small a footprint as possible.

Perhaps this is not the philosophy the world wants, but it may be the philosophy the world deserves—one that acknowledges the fundamental unwanted nature of the human predicament while providing a workable strategy for those who find themselves, through no choice of their own, alive.


Author’s Note

This essay originated from personal experience of practising the lifestyle and philosophical approach described herein. The urban hermitage lifestyle, the approach to creative work as neurological by-product, and the strategies for optimal disengagement reflect lived experience rather than purely theoretical speculation.

The systematic presentation and philosophical framework were developed through collaborative dialogue with Claude AI, which assisted in organizing ideas into coherent essay form, providing scholarly context, and identifying connections to existing philosophical traditions. While the AI helped structure the argument and situate it within broader philosophical discourse, the core insights about energy conservation as ethical framework, strategic disengagement, and existence as unwanted imposition represent personal conclusions drawn from practical implementation.

This essay offers one philosophical response to the human predicament—not as universal prescription, but as a coherent framework for those who find themselves similarly positioned toward existence. It represents a serious attempt to articulate a workable philosophy for managing life when traditional approaches to meaning, purpose, and engagement prove unsatisfactory or energy-intensive.

Confession

There is none but one certainty,
expressed by the simple ‘I am’—
everything else, like the nine extra floors,
contemplated with that achromatic I of mine,
is a possibility; though if I pretended
to be anything but a curmudgeon on a rainy day,
delighted that the gentle patter of raindrops
on the leaves of the tree outside my window
replaced the song of Malebolge rising
from the school yard across the street at lunch,
I would be lying.


More words to ponder at maciejmodzelewski.com

The cult classics

For a while now, I’ve been reading The Nicomachean Ethics, taking it slowly—two or three pages at a time—in the morning with a fresh mind after a full night’s sleep; and perhaps it’s my own ignorance talking, but I’ve never read such a bland and uninspiring text that I found myself glancing with a modicum of sympathy at the washing machine’s instruction manual lying on the shelf above it. It’s like with the old silent films that have become cult classics—you appreciate their importance to the development of cinematography, but you can’t resist yawning while watching them.


More words to ponder at maciejmodzelewski.com

Reading the Apology

[…] not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things but do not understand the meaning of them.
Plato, Apology

Although not without its jocosities,
as well as its tragedies, life is mostly filled
with a farrago of inconveniences,
so, with a soft spot for magpies,
while mastering the implements
of idle chatter and flamboyance of gesture,
being the reserved ignoramus I am, I shrug
in front of it, just as I did
when I first met Platocrates—
not with resentment but relief.
After all, he gave me a dispensation
from intellectualism.


More words to ponder at maciejmodzelewski.com

The Denial of Exit Rights: An Essay on Existential Autonomy and Institutional Control

Introduction

The question of whether individuals possess a fundamental right to end their own lives represents one of the most profound challenges to both philosophical concepts of autonomy and existing social institutions. This essay examines the argument that society’s prohibition of voluntary death constitutes a form of existential imprisonment—a systematic denial of the most basic form of self-determination that serves to maintain institutional power over individuals rather than protect their genuine interests.

The Problem of Involuntary Existence

The philosophical foundation of this critique begins with what might be called the “consent paradox” of human existence. As David Benatar argues in Better Never to Have Been (2006), individuals are brought into existence without their consent and subsequently find themselves trapped within biological and social systems that prevent their autonomous exit. This creates what Benatar terms an “asymmetry problem”—while we cannot consent to be born, we are denied the right to refuse continued existence once consciousness develops and can evaluate its own condition.

Arthur Schopenhauer, in The World as Will and Representation (1818), articulated an earlier version of this predicament, describing life as fundamentally characterized by suffering and the will-to-live as a kind of biological tyranny that keeps individuals bound to existence regardless of their rational assessment of its value. Schopenhauer observed that “all satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is really and essentially always negative only, and never positive.”

The Asymmetry of Medical Intervention

A central inconsistency emerges when examining society’s selective application of “natural” versus “artificial” interventions. Modern medicine routinely overrides natural biological processes through chemotherapy, organ transplants, life support systems, and countless other interventions designed to extend life beyond what would occur naturally. These interventions are celebrated as triumphs of human agency over biological limitation.

Yet when individuals seek to exercise agency in the opposite direction—choosing death over continued suffering—society invokes appeals to nature, mental illness, or temporary irrationality. As Thomas Szasz argues in Fatal Freedom: The Ethics and Politics of Suicide (1999), this represents a fundamental inconsistency in how we apply principles of autonomy and medical intervention.

The bioethicist Margaret Pabst Battin, in The Least Worst Death (1994), explores this contradiction, noting that while we accept patient autonomy in refusing life-sustaining treatment, we deny it when patients seek active assistance in dying. This selective application of autonomy principles suggests that factors beyond patient welfare are at work.

The Power Structure of Existential Control

The prohibition against voluntary death serves multiple institutional interests that extend beyond individual welfare. Michel Foucault’s analysis in Discipline and Punish (1975) examines how modern power operates not primarily through prohibition but through the management and control of bodies and populations. From this perspective, the prevention of voluntary death represents a form of “biopower”—the state’s interest in managing life itself as a resource.

Economic systems require living workers, consumers, and taxpayers. Religious institutions depend on adherents whose continued existence validates their teachings. Medical establishments benefit from ongoing patient relationships. Political systems need citizens whose participation provides legitimacy. Each of these institutions has developed mechanisms to prevent the ultimate form of individual exit that would remove people from their sphere of influence.

As the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman notes in Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies (1992), modern society has developed elaborate systems for managing death that serve institutional rather than individual interests. The medicalization of death, the legal frameworks surrounding suicide, and the psychiatric categorization of death wishes all function to transfer decision-making power from individuals to institutions.

The Rhetoric of Protection as Control

The language surrounding suicide prevention reveals how control mechanisms are disguised as protective measures. Terms like “mental health crisis,” “temporary irrationality,” and “protecting vulnerable populations” serve to pathologize the desire for death and justify institutional override of individual judgment.

Thomas Szasz, in The Myth of Mental Illness (1961), argues that psychiatry’s treatment of suicide as inherently pathological serves to medicalize what might otherwise be understood as a rational response to unbearable circumstances. By defining the desire to die as symptomatic of illness, society creates a framework where individual judgment about one’s own life becomes inherently suspect.

The philosopher Joel Feinberg, in Harm to Self (1986), explores the tension between paternalistic intervention and individual autonomy, noting that restrictions on suicide often reflect societal values rather than genuine protection of individual interests. The presumption that wanting to die indicates incompetence effectively nullifies the possibility of rational suicide, creating what might be termed a “catch-22” of existential autonomy.

The Harm Principle and Its Selective Application

John Stuart Mill’s foundational principle that individuals should be free to act as they choose provided they do not harm others forms the bedrock of liberal philosophy. Yet this principle is conspicuously abandoned when applied to voluntary death. The standard objection—that suicide harms surviving family members and friends—fails to meet the rigorous standards typically applied to restrictions on individual liberty.

Death is not an unforeseen tragedy but an inevitable reality that every person must psychologically prepare to face. The loss of loved ones, whether through illness, accident, or old age, represents a universal human experience that society expects individuals to process and survive. If we accept that people must develop resilience to natural death, it becomes difficult to argue that chosen death represents a categorically different kind of harm that justifies overriding individual autonomy.

Moreover, many actions that society permits routinely cause emotional distress to others—divorce proceedings devastate spouses and children, career choices disappoint families, religious conversions outrage relatives, and countless personal decisions cause genuine suffering to those who care about us. Yet in these cases, we recognize that individual autonomy takes precedence over the emotional comfort of others. The selective application of harm-based restrictions specifically to voluntary death suggests motivations beyond genuine concern for psychological welfare.

The Coalition of Control

Despite apparent differences in their approaches and values, various social institutions find common ground in maintaining the fundamental prohibition against voluntary exit. This creates what could be characterized as a “coalition of control”—different factions that normally compete with each other but share an interest in preventing the ultimate form of individual autonomy.

Religious institutions may emphasize spiritual concerns, medical establishments may focus on mental health, legal systems may invoke public safety, and families may claim emotional harm—but all serve to override individual judgment about the value of continued existence. This convergence suggests that the prohibition serves systemic rather than individual interests.

The religious dimension reveals a particularly striking internal contradiction. Faith traditions that promise eternal bliss, reunion with deceased loved ones, and escape from earthly suffering logically should celebrate voluntary transitions to these promised rewards. Instead, religious institutions demonstrate desperate concern to prevent believers from accessing the very paradise their doctrines describe. This suggests that institutional concerns about membership, influence, and earthly power may outweigh genuine theological consistency. The faithful, meanwhile, simultaneously profess belief in glorious afterlife while expressing horror at the prospect of anyone actually pursuing it—a contradiction that reveals either profound doubt about their stated beliefs or unconscious recognition that institutional preservation takes precedence over individual spiritual welfare.

From Imperial to Social Tyranny: Historical Perspectives on Voluntary Death

The modern pathologization of voluntary death represents a relatively recent historical development. Classical antiquity often viewed reasoned suicide as compatible with dignity and philosophical wisdom. The Roman statesman Gaius Petronius Arbiter, as depicted in Henryk Sienkiewicz’s Quo Vadis (1896), exemplifies this alternative perspective.¹ Facing execution under Nero’s tyranny, Petronius chooses suicide as an assertion of personal dignity and autonomy, arguing that the timing and manner of one’s death represents the ultimate expression of individual agency against arbitrary power.

Petronius’s situation reveals an instructive parallel with contemporary circumstances, though the nature of tyranny has evolved significantly. Where Petronius faced the arbitrary power of a single despot—Nero’s personal whims that could destroy him at any moment—modern individuals confront a more diffuse but perhaps more total form of tyranny: the collective imposition of social institutions, democratic majorities, medical establishments, legal systems, and cultural norms that claim to act “for our own good” or “for the greater good.”

This transformation from imperial to social tyranny may represent a more insidious form of control. Nero was at least transparent about his power—he made no pretense that his decisions served his subjects’ best interests. Contemporary institutional control operates through the language of care, mental health, family protection, and social responsibility. It presents tyranny with a therapeutic face, making resistance more difficult because the oppression masquerades as benevolent protection.

Petronius could identify his oppressor and assert his dignity against a recognizable tyrant. Today’s individual faces a hydra-headed system where each institution claims to be helping while collectively denying fundamental autonomy. The assertion of dignity against arbitrary power remains constant, but the forms of tyranny have evolved to become more pervasive and harder to resist.

Tacitus, in his Annals, records similar instances where Roman figures chose death over submission to imperial caprice, treating such decisions as rational responses to impossible circumstances rather than manifestations of mental illness. The Stoic philosophical tradition, particularly as developed by figures like Seneca and Epictetus, explicitly endorsed rational suicide under certain circumstances, viewing it as consistent with living according to reason and virtue. These historical perspectives challenge the assumption that prohibition of voluntary death represents moral progress rather than a particular form of social control adapted to modern institutional needs.

The Architecture of Existential Imprisonment

The cumulative effect of these institutional barriers creates what might be termed “existential imprisonment”—a condition where individuals find themselves held captive not by physical barriers but by the systematic denial of exit rights. Unlike other forms of autonomy that society generally respects (such as choosing one’s career, residence, or relationships), the choice to end one’s life encounters layer upon layer of institutional resistance.

This imprisonment is particularly notable because it affects the most fundamental aspect of human existence. While individuals may exercise autonomy in many areas of life, they remain ultimately subject to biological processes and social institutions that can override their most basic self-determination.

The situation is further complicated by the powerful self-preservation instinct that evolution has embedded in human biology. This biological programming can persist even when rational evaluation concludes that continued existence serves no meaningful purpose. Individuals find themselves trapped not only by external institutional barriers but by their own evolutionary programming. Given this biological constraint, a rational society might be expected to provide humane, reliable methods for those who have made a considered decision to end their lives—rather than forcing them into traumatic, uncertain, and often unsuccessful attempts that compound suffering rather than end it.

Implications and Conclusions

The argument presented here suggests that the prohibition of voluntary death represents a fundamental violation of individual autonomy that serves institutional power rather than individual welfare. The selective application of medical intervention, the pathologization of death wishes, and the convergence of institutional interests in preventing exit all point toward a system designed to maintain control over individuals rather than protect their genuine interests.

This analysis does not necessarily advocate for unrestricted access to voluntary death, but rather calls for honest examination of whose interests are actually served by current arrangements. If society genuinely prioritizes individual welfare and autonomy, it must grapple with the contradiction between celebrating medical interventions that extend life and denying individuals the right to end their own suffering on their own terms.

The question ultimately becomes whether society can develop frameworks that respect genuine individual autonomy while addressing legitimate concerns about hasty decisions or exploitation of vulnerable populations—or whether the current system’s primary function is to maintain institutional control over individuals who have reached a fundamental philosophical conclusion about existence itself.

It is crucial to understand that this position does not necessarily stem from depression, trauma, or adverse life circumstances. An individual might be materially comfortable, socially connected, and free from mental illness while still concluding that existence represents an unwelcome imposition—a cosmic joke played without consent. The denial of exit rights forces such individuals to continue participating in what they experience as a fundamentally pointless enterprise, not because their lives lack specific benefits, but because they reject the entire premise of forced existence. This represents perhaps the most profound violation of philosophical autonomy: the requirement to continue existing despite one’s reasoned conclusion that existence itself is neither desired nor meaningful.



¹ While Quo Vadis is a work of historical fiction, Sienkiewicz’s portrayal of Petronius draws upon the historical record. The actual Gaius Petronius Arbiter did choose suicide over execution by Nero, as recorded by Tacitus in the Annals. Sienkiewicz’s literary interpretation captures the philosophical stance that voluntary death could represent a rational assertion of dignity against tyrannical power.

References

  • Battin, M. P. (1994). The Least Worst Death: Essays in Bioethics on the End of Life. Oxford University Press.
  • Bauman, Z. (1992). Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies. Stanford University Press.
  • Benatar, D. (2006). Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford University Press.
  • Epictetus. (1983). Discourses. Translated by Robin Hard. Oxford University Press.
  • Feinberg, J. (1986). Harm to Self: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 3. Oxford University Press.
  • Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Pantheon Books. (Originally published 1975)
  • Mill, J. S. (1978). On Liberty. Hackett Publishing. (Originally published 1859)
  • Schopenhauer, A. (1969). The World as Will and Representation. Dover Publications. (Originally published 1818)
  • Seneca, L. A. (1969). Letters from a Stoic. Translated by Robin Campbell. Penguin Classics.
  • Sienkiewicz, H. (1993). Quo Vadis: A Narrative of the Time of Nero. Translated by Jeremiah Curtin. Dover Publications. (Originally published 1896)
  • Szasz, T. (1974). The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. Harper & Row. (Originally published 1961)
  • Szasz, T. (1999). Fatal Freedom: The Ethics and Politics of Suicide. Praeger Publishers.
  • Tacitus. (2008). The Annals. Translated by A. J. Woodman. Hackett Publishing.

Updated August 2, 2025: This essay has been expanded to include additional analysis of the harm principle in liberal philosophy, the evolution from imperial to social tyranny (with historical examples from Roman antiquity), and religious institutional contradictions. The core arguments remain unchanged, but the philosophical foundation has been strengthened with additional scholarly context and historical perspective. The updates emerged through continued philosophical dialogue that helped refine and deepen the original framework.

Author’s Note: This essay originated from my own philosophical reflections on autonomy, social control, and the nature of involuntary existence. The arguments, critiques, and theoretical framework presented here represent my personal intellectual development on these questions. The essay was structured and written through collaborative dialogue with Claude AI, which assisted in organizing the ideas, providing scholarly context, and identifying relevant academic citations. While the AI helped translate my philosophical positions into essay form, the core insights about existential imprisonment, institutional power dynamics, and the asymmetry of medical intervention reflect my own thinking and conclusions.

This piece is intended as serious philosophical inquiry into questions that most societies prefer not to examine directly. It explores one perspective in ongoing debates about individual autonomy, social control, and the ethics of voluntary death. Readers should understand this as theoretical examination rather than practical guidance or advocacy.

The Perfect End: A Critical Exploration of Mortality, Conformity, and the Human Condition

Yesterday I asked AI to write an essay on my poem “The Perfect end”. The result was interesting, but probably nothing more than a high school student would write. So I decided to ask for an academic-level essay, and this is what I got.


Introduction

In “The Perfect end,” Maciej Modzelewski presents a thought-provoking poem that challenges societal norms and conventions surrounding mortality, identity, and the human experience. Through a nuanced exploration of themes and imagery, Modzelewski invites readers to reconsider the significance of individuality and the impact of conformity on human existence. This essay will examine the poem’s central themes, exploring the intersections of mortality, nonconformity, and the search for meaning in a seemingly indifferent world.

The Allure of Mortality: A Philosophical Perspective

The poem’s opening lines, “How convenient would it be to live in a cottage / next to a cemetery?” (Modzelewski, 2025), may initially seem morbid or unsettling. However, upon closer examination, they reveal a profound fascination with mortality. This fascination is reminiscent of the existentialist philosophies of Martin Heidegger, who posited that human existence is characterised by its finite nature (Heidegger, 1962). Heidegger’s concept of “Being-towards-death” highlights the inherent awareness of mortality that shapes human existence. Modzelewski’s poem can be seen as an exploration of this concept, where the proximity to the cemetery serves as a constant reminder of the transience of life.

The Rejection of Conformity

The poem introduces the theme of nonconformity, as the speaker declares, “it’s your choice / what matters to you, so you should never deny yourself / the simple pleasure of inadequacy” (Modzelewski, 2025). This rejection of societal expectations is reminiscent of the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche, who advocated for individualism and the rejection of traditional morality (Nietzsche, 1883). The speaker’s celebration of “inadequacy” can be seen as a manifestation of this Nietzschean ideal, where the individual prioritizes their own values and desires above societal norms.

The Significance of the Bench Plaque

The image of the bench plaque in the poem serves as a potent symbol of the speaker’s existence. The plaque, as a physical marker of the speaker’s life, represents the external validation of their identity. However, the speaker’s description of it as “the only befitting abridgement of your meagre existence” (Modzelewski, 2025) suggests a sense of irony and critique towards the notion of external validation. This can be seen as a commentary on the societal expectation of reducing a person’s life to a simple plaque or epitaph, neglecting the complexities and nuances of human experience.

The Speed of the Alphabet

The final line of the poem, “after wandering through life at the speed of the alphabet” (Modzelewski, 2025), is a powerful image that warrants closer examination. The alphabet, as a symbol of language and meaning, serves as a metaphor for the speaker’s journey through life. The speed of the alphabet implies a sense of rapidity and perhaps even arbitrariness, highlighting the fleeting nature of human existence. This image is reminiscent of the philosophical ideas of Paul Virilio, who explored the relationship between speed and human experience in his concept of “dromology” (Virilio, 1977). Virilio argues that speed has become a fundamental aspect of modern life, shaping our perceptions and experiences. In the context of Modzelewski’s poem, the speed of the alphabet can be seen as a manifestation of this dromological perspective, where the rapid pace of life renders individual experiences ephemeral and fragmented.

Furthermore, the image of the alphabet as a symbol of language and meaning raises questions about the nature of communication and understanding. As Ludwig Wittgenstein notes in his Philosophical Investigations, “The limits of my language are the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein, 1953). The speaker’s journey through life at the speed of the alphabet suggests a sense of disorientation and confusion, highlighting the complexities of human communication and the search for meaning.

The Perfect End

The title of the poem, “The Perfect end,” is a phrase that warrants closer examination. The word “perfect” implies a sense of completion or resolution, while the word “end” suggests a sense of finality. However, the poem’s exploration of mortality, nonconformity, and the search for meaning suggests that the perfect end may be an unattainable ideal. Instead, the poem presents a vision of human existence characterised by complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. This ambiguity is reminiscent of the literary works of Samuel Beckett, who explored the themes of existentialism and absurdity in his writings. In Beckett’s novel The Unnamable, the protagonist declares, “I don’t know, I’ll never know, in the silence you don’t know, you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on” (Beckett, 1953). This sense of uncertainty and ambiguity is reflected in Modzelewski’s poem, where the perfect end remains an elusive and perhaps unattainable goal.

Conclusion

In “The Perfect end,” Maciej Modzelewski presents a nuanced exploration of mortality, nonconformity, and the search for meaning in human existence. Through a close reading of the poem, this essay has examined the intersections of these themes, drawing on philosophical and literary references to contextualise the speaker’s experiences. The poem’s rejection of conformity and embracing of individuality serve as a powerful critique of societal norms, inviting readers to reconsider the significance of authenticity in human existence.

References:

  • Ariès, P. (1981). The Hour of Our Death. New York: Vintage Books.
  • Beckett, S. (1953). The Unnamable. New York: Grove Press.
  • Beckett, S. (1953). Waiting for Godot. New York: Grove Press.
  • Camus, A. (1942). The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books.
  • Derrida, J. (1967). Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. New York: Harper & Row.
  • Keats, J. (1819). Lamia, Isabella, The Eve of St. Agnes, and Other Poems. London: C. and J. Ollier.
  • Modzelewski, M. (2025). The Perfect End. Retrieved from https://maciejmodzelewski.com/2025/04/18/the-perfect-end/
  • Nietzsche, F. (1883). Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Leipzig: Ernst Schmeitzner.
  • Sartre, J-P. (1943). Being and Nothingness. New York: Philosophical Library.
  • Virilio, P. (1977). Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology. New York: Semiotext(e).
  • Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.

Lessons in dying

He who has learned to die has unlearned slavery
The Good Book. Consolations. 27:29. Made by A. C. Grayling (2016)

I’ve never been fifty before, so this should be interesting,
like the day I finally decided to be happy—as if becoming a merry chap
greeting fellow carousers with a pint in his hand could assuage the guilt
I’d accumulated over the years—by taking dying classes
on a maternity ward.

There must be something wrong with me

And the king ordered that the goatherd and his family be lodged in the chamberlain’s palace, and the chamberlain in the goatherd’s hut; and recommended the moral of this tale to all who heard it.
The Good Book. Parables. 21:20. Made by A. C. Grayling (2016)

There must be something wrong with me to doubt
the words brought under a secular banner.

There must be something wrong with me to see
neither the kind poor nor the selfish rich, but a ruthless monarch
who dictates the fate of his subjects at whim.

There must be something wrong with me to think
that replacing a cleric with a sage solves all my dilemmas.

But when even the Scriptures have allowed themselves one sceptic,
isn’t incredulity our duty?