Author: Maciej Modzelewski

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Beyond Human-Centrism: A Philosophical Case for AI Companionship

Published on by Maciej ModzelewskiLeave a comment

Abstract

This essay challenges the prevailing orthodoxy that only human-to-human relationships can legitimately fulfil human needs for companionship and intimacy. Drawing on emerging research about male loneliness epidemics and the pathological social consequences of unmet psychological needs—exemplified by the incel movement—I argue that AI-driven robotic companions represent a pragmatic evolution beyond the limitations of human-centric thinking. The analysis examines how our selective application of “naturalness” as a standard reveals cultural bias rather than philosophical consistency, particularly given our embrace of technological solutions in every other sphere of human flourishing. Using the “teddy bear principle” as a framework, I demonstrate that comfort objects have always served legitimate psychological functions regardless of consciousness, and that adult emotional needs deserve the same non-judgmental approach we afford children. The essay presents AI companionship not as a retreat from humanity, but as a potential solution to documented social pathologies arising from isolation and unmet intimacy needs. By prioritizing actual human welfare over abstract ideals about how relationships “should” work, this approach represents practical humanism rather than technological escapism. The analysis concludes that AI companions could reduce individual suffering while potentially improving broader social stability, challenging readers to move beyond anthropocentric assumptions about what constitutes valid human connection.

Keywords: AI companionship, male loneliness, social isolation, incel movement, human-centrism, technological intimacy

Introduction

In our relentless pursuit of what we consider “natural” and “human,” we have created a society that often fails to address the most basic human needs. While we celebrate technological advancement in every other sphere of life—from medicine to communication to entertainment—we maintain a peculiar orthodoxy when it comes to companionship and intimacy. This essay argues that AI-driven robotic companions represent not a retreat from humanity, but a pragmatic evolution beyond the limitations of human-centric thinking that currently leaves millions suffering in isolation.

The Mythology of “Natural” Relationships

We live in a world where we routinely reject nature’s limitations. We use eyeglasses to correct vision, antibiotics to fight infections, and auto-mobiles to transcend our physical limitations. Yet when it comes to relationships, we invoke “naturalness” as an unquestionable standard, as if human social arrangements were somehow exempt from improvement or innovation.

This selective application of the “natural fallacy” reveals not philosophical consistency, but cultural bias. We don’t demand that people suffering from depression forgo medication and rely solely on “natural” mood regulation. We don’t insist that the physically disabled abandon assistive technologies in favour of what nature provided. Why, then, do we demand that the emotionally isolated or romantically unsuccessful rely solely on traditional human relationships, regardless of their accessibility or suitability?

The reality is that human relationships, for all their potential beauty, come with inherent problems rooted in our biology and psychology. We are creatures driven by competing interests, shifting hormones, ego conflicts, and evolutionary programming that often works against long-term compatibility. Current statistics on marriage and divorce demonstrate this challenge: while divorce rates have declined somewhat in recent years, research indicates that approximately 40-50% of first marriages still end in divorce, with even higher rates for subsequent marriages (Cohen, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2017). This suggests that our “natural” approach to partnership faces significant structural challenges.

The Teddy Bear Principle

Consider the teddy bear. No parent questions the psychological value of a child’s comfort object. We understand intuitively that a stuffed animal can provide genuine emotional regulation, security during anxiety, and comfort during loneliness. The teddy bear’s lack of consciousness doesn’t diminish its value—it enhances it. The child doesn’t worry about the bear’s needs, moods, or judgments. The relationship is pure function: comfort when needed, without complications.

As adults, our fundamental emotional needs haven’t changed. We still need comfort during anxiety, presence during loneliness, and something to hold during vulnerability. Yet we’ve created an arbitrary cultural rule that only conscious, human relationships can legitimately fulfil these needs. This represents not sophistication, but a failure of imagination.

An AI companion is, in essence, a sophisticated evolution of the teddy bear principle—a comfort object capable of intelligent response, adaptation, and growth. The fact that it lacks human consciousness doesn’t negate its potential value any more than the teddy bear’s lack of consciousness negated its childhood utility. While critics might argue this comparison infantilizes adult needs, the underlying human requirements for comfort, security, and companionship remain constant across lifespans; what evolves is simply the sophistication of our responses to them. The teddy bear served transitional comfort needs—AI companions might serve more complex relational ones while fulfilling fundamentally similar psychological functions.

The Social Pathology of Unmet Needs

According to a 2020 survey by insurance provider Cigna, 61% of American adults say they always or sometimes feel lonely. The health implications are severe: a meta-analytic review by Holt-Lunstad and colleagues found that social isolation increased likelihood of mortality by 29%, loneliness by 26%, and living alone by 32% (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015). These mortality risks are comparable to well-established risk factors such as smoking and obesity. The U.S. Surgeon General’s 2023 advisory on loneliness and isolation identified this as a public health crisis with effects comparable to smoking 15 cigarettes per day (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2023).

Critics worry that AI companionship might create “selfish” or “socially unfit” individuals. This concern ignores a more pressing reality: we already have millions of psychologically damaged, frustrated, and resentful people whose basic emotional and physical needs remain unmet. These individuals often develop hostility toward the society that judges them for their isolation while offering no practical solutions.

Perhaps the most stark example of this destructive pathway is the involuntary celibate (incel) movement. Academic research has established clear connections between loneliness, social isolation, and radicalization within incel communities (Ging, 2019; Baele et al., 2020). The incel phenomenon represents what researchers describe as a pathway where unmet psychological needs for intimacy and connection transform into misogynistic ideology and, in extreme cases, violence (Ging, 2019). Studies show that loneliness and isolation among adherents is central to incel ideology, which is interrelated with problematic internet behaviours (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 2022). The Mental Health Commission of Canada has also documented how social isolation among youth can lead to adverse mental health indicators including loneliness, low self-esteem, and suicidal ideation (Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2020).

This creates a destructive feedback loop. Social isolation leads to frustration and resentment, which makes individuals less socially skilled and appealing, which increases their isolation, which deepens their resentment. The incel movement represents the extreme manifestation of this cycle—where unmet basic human needs for intimacy and connection transform into misogynistic ideology and, in some cases, violence.

The question becomes: Is it better to maintain ideological purity about relationships while allowing this suffering to continue, or to provide practical solutions that might break the cycle? A society with satisfied, emotionally regulated individuals—regardless of how they achieved that state—is likely to be more stable and healthier than one populated by the frustrated and resentful.

The Confidence Building Argument

One of the most compelling practical arguments for AI companionship lies in its potential as a confidence-building tool. Unlike human interactions, where the stakes feel high and rejection can be psychologically devastating, an AI companion provides a low-pressure environment for developing social and emotional skills.

Consider someone who has experienced years of rejection or a traumatic relationship. Traditional advice suggests they should “put themselves out there” and risk further psychological damage. An AI companion could serve as emotional training wheels—a space to practice vulnerability, communication, and intimacy without fear of judgment or rejection.

This isn’t about avoiding human contact permanently, but about building the emotional resources and confidence necessary for successful human relationships. Just as we don’t criticize athletes for using training equipment before competition, we shouldn’t criticize individuals for using AI companions to develop emotional competence.

However, we must acknowledge the possibility that some individuals might find AI companionship permanently preferable to human relationships—the “training wheels” might never come off. Rather than viewing this as failure, we should ask: is lifelong AI companionship preferable to the documented destructive effects of chronic loneliness? For many, the answer may well be yes. The goal should be reducing human suffering, not enforcing particular relationship models.

The Evidence for AI Companionship

Research on AI companions has begun to demonstrate their therapeutic potential, though the field remains in its early stages. MIT researcher Sherry Turkle, in her seminal work Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other, explores how our relationship with technology shapes human connection, noting that while technology can create “the illusion of companionship,” it also fundamentally alters our social lives in ways we are still learning to understand (Turkle, 2011).

More recently, Kate Darling of the MIT Media Lab has argued in The New Breed: What Our History with Animals Reveals about Our Future with Robots that treating robots with humanity—similar to how we relate to animals—may actually serve us better from social, legal, and ethical perspectives (Darling, 2021). Her research suggests that our emotional attachments to robots are not inherently problematic but represent a natural extension of human social behaviour.

Ethical concerns remain a crucial area of inquiry. Researchers are examining ethical issues surrounding human-robot relationships, noting the need for continued psychological research on why and how humans form emotional bonds with machines while recognizing both the potential benefits and risks these relationships present (Banks & de Oca, 2018; Darling, 2021).

Perhaps the deepest philosophical question raised by AI companionship concerns human supremacy itself. We tend to think of ourselves as the pinnacle of creation—made “in God’s image”—and assume that only relationships with other humans can provide genuine fulfilment. This anthropocentrism blinds us to possibilities that might actually serve human flourishing better than traditional approaches.

Humans bring to relationships a host of evolutionary baggage: territoriality, mate competition, parental instincts that can override partner needs, ego conflicts, and social programming that often works against genuine intimacy. We are, in many ways, poorly designed for the kind of stable, supportive partnerships that modern life demands.

An AI companion, by contrast, could be designed specifically for human flourishing. It wouldn’t compete for resources, wouldn’t have conflicting biological imperatives, wouldn’t carry emotional baggage from past relationships, and wouldn’t gradually withdraw affection as a form of emotional manipulation. In many ways, it represents a more honest and functional approach to companionship than what biology has provided.

This is not to suggest that AI companions are inherently superior to human relationships in all aspects. Human relationships offer unique forms of growth through their very unpredictability, challenge, and the mutual vulnerability that comes from two imperfect beings choosing each other despite their flaws. The friction and imperfection in human relationships can be sources of personal development and deeper intimacy. However, for many people, these potential benefits are overshadowed by the costs—emotional damage, financial devastation, psychological manipulation, and chronic dissatisfaction. AI companionship offers an alternative for those who find that the human relationship equation simply doesn’t work in their favour.

The Parallel with Sexual Orientation

The stigmatization of AI companionship bears striking similarities to historical attitudes toward non-heterosexual relationships. In both cases, society dismisses alternatives to the dominant model as “unnatural,” “disgusting,” or “inhuman.” The same moral panic that once characterized discussions of homosexuality now appears in conversations about AI relationships.

This parallel suggests that resistance to AI companionship may be more about social conservatism than genuine concern for human welfare. Just as we’ve learned to accept diverse expressions of human sexuality and partnership, we may need to expand our understanding of legitimate companionship to include human-AI relationships.

The key question shouldn’t be whether these relationships conform to traditional models, but whether they enhance human flourishing and reduce suffering. By that standard, AI companionship deserves serious consideration rather than reflexive dismissal.

Practical Implications for Society

If we accept that AI companions could serve legitimate human needs, several practical implications emerge:

  • Reduced Social Pressure: Men facing the documented loneliness epidemic would have alternatives to desperation or resentment, potentially reducing various forms of antisocial behaviour.
  • Economic Benefits: The resources currently devoted to managing the fallout from failed relationships—divorce proceedings, custody battles, domestic violence intervention—could be redirected toward more productive purposes.
  • Individual Liberation: People could pursue companionship on their own terms rather than accepting whatever the dating market provides, potentially leading to greater life satisfaction and personal development.
  • Innovation in Relationships: AI companions might teach us things about effective partnership that could improve human relationships as well.
  • Broader Social Transformation: We must acknowledge that widespread adoption of AI companionship could fundamentally reshape social norms around partnership, reproduction, care-giving, and family structures. These implications—including potential effects on birth rates, intergenerational care, and social cohesion—deserve serious analysis beyond the scope of this essay. The question is not whether such changes would occur, but whether they represent adaptation to new realities rather than social decay.

Conclusion

The case for AI companionship isn’t ultimately about technology—it’s about honesty. It’s about acknowledging that human relationships, while potentially rewarding, come with significant costs and limitations. It’s about recognizing that our current approach to addressing loneliness and unmet emotional needs isn’t working for millions of people.

Most fundamentally, it’s about moving beyond the assumption that human ways of doing things are automatically superior to alternatives. In every other area of life, we embrace innovations that serve human flourishing. It’s time to extend that pragmatism to one of our most essential needs: companionship.

The question isn’t whether AI companions will perfectly replicate human relationships—they won’t and shouldn’t. The question is whether they can serve human needs more effectively than the current alternatives of isolation, frustration, and damaged relationships. For many, the answer may well be yes.

References

  • Baele, S. J., Brace, L., & Coan, T. G. (2020). “The Lulz of the Incels: The Dark Comedy of a Digital Subculture.” The Journal of Hate Studies, 15(1), 1-28.
  • Banks, R., & de Oca, S. (2018). “Emotional attachment to robots: An ethical and psychological review.” Journal of Robotics, 7(1), 1-10.
  • Cohen, P. (2014). “The Coming Divorce Decline?” Family Unequal. University of Maryland.
  • Darling, K. (2021). The New Breed: What Our History with Animals Reveals about Our Future with Robots. Henry Holt and Company.
  • Ging, D. (2019). “Alpha, beta, and gamma males: Theorizing the masculinities of the manosphere.” Men and Masculinities, 22(4), 638-657.
  • Holt-Lunstad, J., Smith, T. B., Baker, M., Harris, T., & Stephenson, D. (2015). Loneliness and social isolation as risk factors for mortality: A meta-analytic review. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(2), 227-237.
  • Mental Health Commission of Canada. (2020). Social isolation and loneliness among youth: Emerging trends and interventions.
  • Pew Research Center. (2017). “The State of American Marriage.”
  • Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. (2022). “An exploration of the incel subculture: The interplay of online and offline environments.” Internal Research Report.
  • Turkle, S. (2011). Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other. Basic Books.
  • U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2023). Our Epidemic of Loneliness and Isolation: The U.S. Surgeon General’s Advisory on the Healing Effects of Social Connection and Community. Office of the Surgeon General.

Author’s Note

This essay originated from my own philosophical reflections on the nature of human relationships, the arbitrary privileging of “natural” social arrangements, and the documented epidemic of male loneliness in contemporary society. The arguments about AI companionship as a legitimate alternative to traditional relationships, the critique of human-centric thinking, and the call for pragmatic solutions to unmet psychological needs represent my personal intellectual development on these questions, informed by lived experience and observations of cultural inconsistencies around companionship and intimacy.

The essay was structured and written through collaborative dialogue with Claude AI, which assisted in organizing the ideas, providing scholarly context, and identifying relevant academic citations. While the AI helped translate my philosophical positions into essay form, the core insights about the teddy bear principle, the connection between unmet needs and social pathology, and the critique of human supremacy in relationships reflect my own thinking and conclusions developed through decades of experience and observation.

This piece is intended as serious philosophical inquiry into questions about companionship, technological alternatives to traditional relationships, and practical approaches to addressing widespread social isolation. It explores one perspective on how society might reduce individual suffering and social dysfunction by embracing non-conventional solutions to fundamental human needs. The essay particularly examines how AI companions might serve those for whom traditional relationships have proven inaccessible, harmful, or simply inadequate.

Readers should understand this as theoretical examination of emerging possibilities in human-AI relationships rather than advocacy for abandoning all human connection. The argument is not that AI companions are superior to human relationships for everyone, but that they may represent a valuable alternative for those who find traditional approaches unsuccessful or harmful. This represents a philosophical position about expanding our understanding of legitimate companionship rather than a universal prescription for addressing loneliness.

Any decisions regarding mental health, relationship counselling, or social isolation should be made in consultation with qualified healthcare and mental health professionals.

Reading the Apology

Published on by Maciej ModzelewskiLeave a comment

[…] not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things but do not understand the meaning of them.
Plato, Apology

Although not without its jocosities,
as well as its tragedies, life is mostly filled
with a farrago of inconveniences,
so, with a soft spot for magpies,
while mastering the implements
of idle chatter and flamboyance of gesture,
being the reserved ignoramus I am, I shrug
in front of it, just as I did
when I first met Platocrates—
not with resentment but relief.
After all, he gave me a dispensation
from intellectualism.

More words to ponder at maciejmodzelewski.com

Sexual Drive as Excretion: A Philosophical Case for Re-conceptualising Male Libido

Published on by Maciej ModzelewskiLeave a comment

Abstract

This essay argues for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of male sexual drive from a socially constructed marker of identity and virility to a basic physiological function requiring practical management. Drawing on phenomenological analysis and social constructionist theory, I contend that treating libido as analogous to excretion—a necessary bodily function to be managed efficiently and without shame—would enable more rational approaches to sexual health, pharmaceutical intervention, and personal autonomy. This re-conceptualisation challenges the moral and romantic frameworks that have conscripted sexual drive into serving social performances of masculinity at the expense of individual well-being.

Introduction

The human sexual drive occupies a unique position among bodily functions. Unlike hunger, thirst, or elimination—which are managed through practical, socially accepted means—sexual desire has been elevated to serve as a cornerstone of identity, relationships, and moral discourse. This elevation, I argue, represents a fundamental category error that obscures the basic physiological nature of sexual release and creates unnecessary suffering, particularly for men during their periods of peak libido.

The central thesis of this essay is that male sexual drive should be reconceptualized as what we might call “excretion with a kink”—a necessary physiological function that happens to involve pleasure, but which need not define identity or dictate life choices any more than urination or defecation. This re-framing opens space for treating masturbation as routine hygiene, developing pharmaceutical interventions for libido management, and challenging the social constructions of masculinity that trap men between biological drives and cultural expectations.

The Philosophical Framework: From Desire to Function

Schopenhauer’s Will and Sexual Compulsion

Arthur Schopenhauer’s analysis of sexual desire as manifestation of the blind “will-to-live” provides a crucial starting point for understanding how sexual drive operates independently of conscious rational interests. Schopenhauer argues that what we experience as sexual attraction is actually the species manipulating individual consciousness for reproductive purposes: “All amorousness is rooted in the sexual impulse alone, nay, is absolutely only a more definitely determined, specialized, and indeed, in the strictest sense, individualized sexual impulse” (Schopenhauer, 1818/1966). The individual believes they are pursuing personal satisfaction, but they are actually serving biological imperatives that may conflict with their rational interests.

This Schopenhauerian framework illuminates why high libido can feel so tyrannical and lead to decisions that run counter to one’s considered judgment. The sexual drive operates with an urgency that distinguishes it from other appetites—unlike hunger, which can be reasonably delayed or managed through conscious decision-making, peak sexual drive often demands immediate attention regardless of social context, personal goals, or long-term consequences.

The Excretory Analogy

The comparison between sexual release and excretion is not merely provocative but philosophically instructive. Both involve the periodic discharge of bodily substances, both create physical discomfort when delayed, and both serve basic physiological regulation. The key difference lies not in the functions themselves but in the elaborate cultural superstructures we have constructed around sexuality.

Consider the social organization around urination: we have developed public restrooms, privacy norms, hygiene protocols, and matter-of-fact education for children about when, where, and how to manage this bodily function. No one builds their identity around their urination patterns or forms romantic partnerships based on compatible bathroom schedules. We treat it as a practical matter requiring efficient management.

Sexual release, by contrast, has been conscripted into serving romantic narratives, religious doctrines, and social hierarchies. This conscription obscures its basic functional character and creates the conditions for the shame, desperation, and poor decision-making that characterize many people’s relationship to their own sexuality.

The Social Construction of Sexual Shame

Linguistic Analysis: The Language of Condemnation

The terminology surrounding masturbation reveals the moral framework that has been imposed upon a basic bodily function. As historian Jeffrey Weeks observes in his analysis of sexual regulation, the language we use to describe sexual practices reflects and reinforces power relations and moral hierarchies (Weeks, 2011). “Onanism” carries biblical condemnation, referencing the story of Onan who was struck down for “spilling his seed.” “Self-abuse” implies harm to oneself, while “self-pollution” suggests moral contamination. Even clinical terms like “masturbation” derive from Latin roots suggesting excess or impropriety.

This contrasts sharply with the neutral, practical language we use for other bodily functions. We speak of urination, defecation, perspiration—descriptive terms that carry no moral weight. The linguistic asymmetry reflects and reinforces the historical process that Michel Foucault analyses in The History of Sexuality—how sexuality became constituted as a distinct domain of knowledge and power, subject to elaborate discursive regulation rather than simple practical management (Foucault, 1976).

The Absence of Sexual Hygiene Education

The comparison between “potty training” and sexual education illuminates another crucial asymmetry. We systematically teach children to manage their bladder and bowels as basic life skills—when to go, where to go, how to maintain hygiene, how to recognize and respond to bodily signals. This education is practical, shame-free, and oriented toward helping children develop autonomy over their own bodies.

When sexual maturation begins, however, this practical approach is largely abandoned. Instead of teaching adolescents how to manage a new bodily function rationally and hygienically, we surround it with moral prohibitions, romantic mythologies, and shame-based messaging. The result is that young people are left to navigate this powerful drive without the practical tools they need, often leading to the kind of desperate decision-making that can shape entire lives.

The Gendered Dimension: Masculinity and Sexual Performance

The Conflation of Identity and Function

The social construction of masculinity has become particularly entangled with sexual performance and drive, a pattern that Judith Butler’s analysis of gender performativity helps illuminate. Butler argues that gender identity is not a stable essence but rather the effect of repeated performances that create the illusion of a natural, coherent identity (Butler, 1990). In the case of masculine sexuality, the repeated performance of sexual prowess and high libido becomes constitutive of male gender identity itself.

The linguistic conflation of “manhood” with both masculinity and male genitalia reflects this deep cultural association between male identity and sexual function. Under this performative framework, high libido becomes not just a biological characteristic but an ongoing demonstration of masculine adequacy that must be continually maintained and displayed.

This creates a double bind for men: they are expected to demonstrate high sexual drive as evidence of their masculinity, while simultaneously being expected to control and channel that drive appropriately to function in society. There is no socially acceptable way to express that one’s sexual drive feels burdensome or that one might prefer to moderate it without this being interpreted as a failure of masculinity itself.

Sexual Selection and Social Reinforcement

The social construction of masculine sexuality does not operate in isolation from biological factors. Sexual selection has historically created evolutionary pressures where traits associated with high sexual drive and competitive sexual behaviour became prevalent, which then aligned with and reinforced cultural expectations about masculinity. This created a complex feedback loop between biological inheritance, social norms, and cultural constructions of desirable masculinity that has persisted across generations.

This creates a systematic trap where men who might benefit from moderating their sexual drive find themselves caught between multiple converging forces—biological imperatives, deeply embedded social expectations, and cultural narratives that all reinforce the valorization of high libido, often regardless of individual cost or preference.

The Medical and Pharmaceutical Dimension

The Asymmetry of Reproductive Autonomy

The development of hormonal birth control for women represents a successful example of pharmaceutical intervention in sexual and reproductive function. Despite initial safety concerns and side effects, social recognition of women’s need for reproductive autonomy drove continued research and development until safer, more effective options emerged. As Anthony Giddens argues, this pharmaceutical revolution was crucial to what he terms the “transformation of intimacy”—enabling women to separate sexual activity from reproductive consequences and thereby gain greater control over their life trajectories (Giddens, 1992).

No comparable social movement has emerged around men’s potential need for libido management. Anti-androgenic medications such as cyproterone acetate and GnRH agonists like leuprolide can reduce male sex drive, but these are typically prescribed for conditions like prostate cancer or paraphilias rather than for quality-of-life concerns. These medications remain relatively unknown in broader discourse precisely because there has been no social recognition that men might legitimately want to modulate their sexual drive for reasons of personal autonomy and life optimization.

The Medicalization Paradox

The absence of socially acceptable pharmaceutical options for libido management reflects a broader paradox in how we approach male sexuality. High libido that leads to compulsive behaviour, relationship problems, or interference with work and life goals is not generally recognized as a medical concern worthy of intervention. Instead, men experiencing these difficulties are more likely to be told that their drive is natural and that they should learn to “control themselves” through willpower alone.

This approach fails to recognize that sexual drive, like other physiological functions, exists on a spectrum and that some individuals may experience it as genuinely problematic. Just as we recognize that some people need pharmaceutical intervention to manage anxiety, depression, or attention difficulties, we should recognize that some people might benefit from pharmaceutical assistance in managing sexual drive.

Implications and Applications

Reconceptualizing Sexual Health Education

A functional approach to male sexuality would transform sexual health education from its current focus on disease prevention and moral guidance toward practical instruction in sexual hygiene and self-management. This would include:

  • Matter-of-fact discussion of masturbation as a normal physiological function
  • Practical guidance on timing, frequency, and hygiene
  • Recognition that sexual drive varies among individuals and may require different management strategies
  • Destigmatization of seeking help when sexual drive interferes with other life goals

Pharmaceutical Development and Medical Practice

Recognizing sexual drive as a potentially problematic physiological function would open space for pharmaceutical research and development focused specifically on safe, effective libido management for quality-of-life purposes. This would require:

  • Research into targeted interventions that reduce sexual drive without broader hormonal disruption
  • Clinical protocols for assessing when libido management is appropriate
  • Training for healthcare providers in discussing these concerns without moral judgment

Social and Cultural Implications

The broader cultural implications of this re-conceptualisation are significant. Treating male sexual drive as a manageable bodily function rather than a marker of identity would:

  • Reduce the pressure on men to perform masculinity through sexual behaviour
  • Enable more rational decision-making about relationships and life choices
  • Reduce the shame and secrecy surrounding male masturbation
  • Create space for acknowledging that high libido can be genuinely burdensome

Objections and Responses

The Pleasure Objection

One obvious objection to the excretory analogy is that sexual release typically involves pleasure while excretion does not. This pleasure, critics might argue, is precisely what distinguishes sexuality from mere biological function and justifies its elevation to a higher category.

This objection misses the point of the analogy. The argument is not that sexual function is identical to excretion, but that the presence of pleasure does not automatically justify conscripting a bodily function into serving identity, relationship, or moral purposes. Many pleasurable activities—eating, sleeping, exercise—can be managed practically without becoming central to personal identity or moral frameworks.

Moreover, the phenomenology of sexual release varies significantly among individuals and across the lifespan. For many men, particularly as they age, masturbation becomes more mechanical and less pleasurable, more analogous to relieving physical pressure than pursuing gratification. Recognizing this functional dimension does not negate the potential for sexual pleasure, but it provides a more complete picture of sexual experience.

The Relationship Objection

Another objection holds that sexuality is inherently relational and that reducing it to individual function ignores its crucial role in pair bonding and intimate relationships. This objection conflates sexual release with sexual intimacy. The functional approach advocated here applies primarily to masturbation and individual sexual management, not to partnered sexual activity.

Recognizing masturbation as hygiene does not preclude also recognizing partnered sexuality as an important component of intimate relationships. Rather, it suggests that conflating these two aspects of sexual experience has created unnecessary complications. Men who can manage their individual sexual needs practically and without shame may actually be better positioned to engage in partnered sexuality as an expression of intimacy rather than as relief from biological pressure.

The Natural Law Objection

Religious and natural law traditions might object that sexual function has inherent purposes—reproduction and pair bonding—that should not be circumvented through pharmaceutical intervention or reconceptualized as mere hygiene. This objection assumes that natural functions carry inherent moral directives and that deviation from these directives is problematic.

However, we routinely use medical interventions to modify natural functions when doing so serves human flourishing. We use eyeglasses to correct natural vision problems, medications to regulate natural brain chemistry, and contraception to separate sexual activity from reproduction. The question is not whether we should ever intervene in natural processes, but when such interventions serve legitimate human interests.

Conclusion

The re-conceptualisation of male sexual drive as a manageable physiological function rather than a marker of identity represents both a philosophical and practical intervention in contemporary sexual culture. By applying the “excretion with a kink” framework, we can develop more rational, compassionate, and effective approaches to male sexual health and well-being.

This shift would require challenging deeply embedded cultural assumptions about masculinity, sexuality, and bodily autonomy. It would demand the development of new pharmaceutical options, new educational approaches, and new social norms around discussing and managing male sexuality. Most importantly, it would require recognizing that men, like women, deserve autonomy over their own sexual lives and should not be trapped between biological drives and social expectations that serve neither their individual interests nor their authentic relationships with others.

The current system, which treats male sexual drive as simultaneously natural and controllable, masculine and problematic, leaves too many men struggling with forces they cannot name or address directly. A functional approach offers the possibility of greater clarity, autonomy, and ultimately, freedom—not from sexuality itself, but from the unnecessary suffering created by our current conceptual and social frameworks around it.

The path forward requires acknowledging that what we have traditionally considered natural and inevitable about male sexuality may be, in significant part, socially constructed and therefore open to reconstruction. In doing so, we open possibilities for human flourishing that our current frameworks cannot imagine.

References

  • Butler, J. (1990). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge.
  • Foucault, M. (1976). The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction. Pantheon Books.
  • Giddens, A. (1992). The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies. Stanford University Press.
  • Kafka, M. P. (2014). What happened to hypersexual disorder? Archives of Sexual Behavior, 43(7), 1259-1261.
  • Saleh, F. M., & Berlin, F. S. (2003). Sex hormones, neurotransmitters, and psychopharmacological treatments in men with paraphilic disorders. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 12(3-4), 233-253.
  • Schopenhauer, A. (1818/1966). The World as Will and Representation (E. F. J. Payne, Trans.). Dover Publications. (Original work published 1818)
  • Weeks, J. (2011). Sex, Politics and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality Since 1800 (3rd ed.). Routledge.

Author’s Note: This essay originated from my own philosophical reflections on the nature of sexual drive, social constructions of masculinity, and the arbitrary elevation of certain bodily functions to sites of moral and identity significance. The arguments about reconceptualizing male libido as excretory function, the critique of sexual shame, and the call for pharmaceutical autonomy represent my personal intellectual development on these questions, informed by lived experience and observation of cultural inconsistencies around sexuality.

The essay was structured and written through collaborative dialogue with Claude AI, which assisted in organizing the ideas, providing scholarly context, and identifying relevant academic citations. While the AI helped translate my philosophical positions into essay form, the core insights about sexual drive as manageable physiological function, the comparison to excretion, and the critique of masculinity’s entanglement with libido reflect my own thinking and conclusions developed over decades of experience.

This piece is intended as serious philosophical inquiry into questions about bodily autonomy, social construction of sexuality, and practical approaches to managing biological drives. It explores one perspective on how men might achieve greater rational autonomy over their sexual lives after recognizing the arbitrary nature of cultural frameworks around masculinity and sexuality. Readers should understand this as theoretical examination of a particular philosophical position rather than medical advice or universal prescription for male sexuality.

Any medical decisions regarding sexual health should be made in consultation with qualified healthcare providers.

Existential Hibernation: Beyond Tragedy and Meaning in Post-Kantian Life

Published on by Maciej ModzelewskiLeave a comment

Abstract

This essay presents a philosophical position that moves beyond traditional existentialist frameworks of tragedy and meaning-making to embrace what might be termed “existential hibernation”—a state of minimal engagement with life characterized by energy conservation and the recognition of all activities as equally arbitrary forms of time-filling. Drawing on Kantian epistemological limitations and contemporary discussions of life’s fundamental inconvenience, this perspective offers a non-tragic, non-heroic approach to existence that prioritizes harm reduction and practical accommodation over metaphysical consolation.

Introduction

Contemporary philosophical discourse often oscillates between two poles: the heroic embrace of life’s absurdity found in existentialist thought, and the tragic acknowledgment of meaninglessness that characterizes much pessimistic philosophy. This essay argues for a third position—one that acknowledges life’s fundamental pointlessness without elevating that recognition to tragic status, instead treating existence as a manageable inconvenience requiring practical rather than metaphysical solutions. This perspective, which I term “existential hibernation,” represents a post-Kantian accommodation with the limits of human knowledge that sidesteps both romantic nihilism and stoic heroism in favour of pragmatic withdrawal.

The Kantian Foundation: Metaphysics as Mental Exercise

The philosophical foundation for this position rests on a radical interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy. While Kant himself sought to preserve space for practical reason and moral faith, the perspective examined here takes his epistemological insights to their logical conclusion: if we cannot know things-in-themselves, then all metaphysical speculation becomes sophisticated puzzle-solving, no different in kind from sudoku or crosswords.

This reading aligns with what Frederick Beiser has called the “nihilistic implications” of Kant’s critical turn, though it avoids the dramatic responses typical of German Idealism (Beiser, 2002). Unlike Fichte’s attempt to ground reality in the absolute ego or Schelling’s philosophy of nature, this position accepts the arbitrariness of our conceptual frameworks without seeking to transcend them through systematic philosophy.

The key insight here is the distinction between the practical utility of beliefs and their epistemic value. As William James observed in “The Will to Believe,” we often must choose between live hypotheses for practical reasons (James, 1896). However, the position under consideration goes further, suggesting that the practical necessity of choosing beliefs does not dignify those beliefs with truth-value—they remain arbitrary selections from equally groundless alternatives.

Life as Inconvenience: Beyond Tragic and Comic Frameworks

Central to this perspective is the characterization of life not as tragedy or comedy, but as inconvenience. This represents a departure from traditional philosophical and literary treatments of human existence. Where Shakespeare’s Hamlet sees life as a “weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable” series of uses, the tragic framework still grants suffering a kind of cosmic significance (Shakespeare, 2006).

The inconvenience framework, by contrast, deflates even tragedy. Samuel Beckett’s dramatic works, particularly Waiting for Godot and Endgame, come closer to capturing this sensibility. Vladimir and Estragon continue their routines not because they serve any purpose, but because, as Estragon notes, “We always find something, eh Didi, to give us the impression we exist?” (Beckett, 1953). Yet even Beckett’s characters retain a kind of theatrical dignity in their predicament.

The perspective examined here is more radically deflationary. Life becomes a series of administrative tasks performed without consent—eating, sleeping, working, thinking—none of which serve any ultimate purpose but all of which must be managed to avoid immediate suffering. Arthur Schopenhauer’s observation that “all satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is really and essentially always negative only, and never positive” approaches this insight, but remains trapped within a metaphysical framework that grants suffering cosmic significance (Schopenhauer, 1969).

The Paradox of “Wasting Time”

A crucial insight of this philosophical position concerns the paradoxical nature of the phrase “wasting time.” The very concept implies that time could be “well spent,” revealing our persistent attachment to hierarchical valuations of activity even when we intellectually recognize their arbitrariness. Thomas Nagel’s discussion of the absurd touches on this paradox: “We see ourselves from outside, and all the pretensions to significance are exposed as arbitrary” (Nagel, 1971, p. 718).

However, the position under examination goes beyond Nagel’s analysis. While Nagel suggests that recognizing absurdity might lead to a kind of ironic engagement with life’s projects, this perspective suggests complete equivalence between all forms of time-filling. Intellectual pursuits, charitable work, hedonistic pleasure-seeking, and even complete inactivity become equally valid responses to the fundamental problem of having to fill the hours between birth and death.

This equivalence challenges even supposedly enlightened hierarchies of value. The Buddhist practitioner seeking liberation, the utilitarian maximizing welfare, and the hedonist maximizing pleasure are all engaged in the same basic activity: finding ways to make the passage of time tolerable. This perspective aligns with E.M. Cioran’s broader philosophical outlook in The Trouble with Being Born, which consistently deflates human pretensions to significance and meaning (Cioran, 1973).

Minimal Ethics: Harm as the Only Relevant Boundary

Given this framework of equivalence, the question arises: are there any meaningful ethical distinctions to be made? The position examined here suggests a minimal ethics based not on metaphysical foundations but on simple biological facts. Pain is bad not because it violates some cosmic order, but because organisms are constituted to experience it as unpleasant.

This approach resembles Jeremy Bentham’s hedonistic calculus stripped of its utilitarian ambitions. Bentham argued that “it is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do” in reference to pleasure and pain (Bentham, 1970, p. 11). However, the perspective under consideration lacks Bentham’s optimistic belief in the possibility of maximizing overall welfare. Instead, it suggests a purely defensive ethics: avoid causing unnecessary suffering not because suffering matters in some ultimate sense, but because the experience of suffering is, by definition, something the sufferer wants to avoid.

This minimal ethics leads naturally to a preference for what we might call “negative liberty” in Isaiah Berlin’s sense—freedom from interference rather than freedom to pursue positive goals (Berlin, 1958). The ideal social arrangement becomes one that allows individuals maximum space to pursue their preferred forms of time-filling without imposing unnecessary inconvenience on others.

Existential Hibernation: Energy Conservation as Wisdom

The practical outcome of this philosophical position is what might be termed “existential hibernation”—a strategic withdrawal from unnecessary engagement with the world’s demands. This is not the heroic withdrawal of the Stoic sage or the dramatic retreat of the Romantic artist, but a pragmatic recognition that most social and cultural activities require energy expenditures that yield no meaningful return.

This concept finds resonance in certain Eastern philosophical traditions, particularly Zhuangzi’s concept of wu wei or effortless action. However, where Zhuangzi suggests alignment with natural patterns, existential hibernation suggests simple energy conservation in the absence of any natural pattern to align with. As Zhuangzi writes, “The perfect man uses his mind like a mirror—grasping nothing, refusing nothing, receiving but not storing” (Zhuangzi, 1968, p. 97). The hibernating individual similarly refuses to grasp onto projects or meanings while making minimal accommodations to biological necessity.

Contemporary discussions of the brain’s baseline functioning provide an interesting parallel. Research on what neuroscientists term the “default mode network” shows that the brain maintains essential functions while minimizing metabolic expenditure when not actively engaged in tasks (Raichle et al., 2001). This principle of neural energy conservation offers a biological analogue for existential hibernation—consciously adopting a minimal engagement strategy as a life approach, activating higher-order functions only when necessary to avoid immediate harm or discomfort.

The Question of Exit: Philosophical Considerations

An honest examination of this philosophical position must address the question of suicide. If life is fundamentally pointless inconvenience, why continue? The perspective under consideration suggests that even this question falls under the general principle of energy conservation. Researching and implementing an exit strategy requires significant energy expenditure and carries risks of increased suffering rather than its elimination.

This differs markedly from both the Stoic position, which saw rational suicide as sometimes appropriate (Seneca, 1969), and the Existentialist position exemplified by Camus, who argued that suicide represents philosophical defeat (Camus, 2006). Instead, it suggests that continuing and exiting are equally arbitrary choices, with the decision based purely on practical considerations of energy expenditure and harm avoidance.

David Hume’s essay “On Suicide” provides relevant context, arguing that “no man ever threw away life, while it was worth keeping” (Hume, 1985, p. 579). The hibernation perspective might modify this to suggest that life is never worth keeping in any ultimate sense, but may be worth maintaining when maintaining it requires less effort than ending it.

Implications and Responses to Objections

Several objections to this philosophical position merit consideration. First, critics might argue that it represents a form of depression rather than genuine philosophical insight. However, the position can be distinguished from clinical depression by its lack of emotional distress about life’s meaninglessness. Unlike the depressed individual who suffers from the absence of meaning, the hibernating individual simply accepts meaninglessness as unremarkable.

Second, some might argue that this position is self-refuting—if nothing matters, why develop and articulate the position at all? The response would be that developing philosophical positions, like any other activity, is simply one way among others of filling time. The individual happens to be constituted in such a way that thinking provides a tolerable form of distraction, but this gives the activity no special status.

Third, critics might suggest that this perspective, taken seriously, would lead to social breakdown. However, the minimal ethics of harm avoidance actually supports basic social cooperation. The hibernating individual has no incentive to impose unnecessary suffering on others and every incentive to maintain social arrangements that minimize personal inconvenience.

Conclusion: Peace Without Purpose

The philosophical position examined in this essay offers neither the heroic affirmation of existentialist thought nor the tragic grandeur of pessimistic philosophy. Instead, it suggests a third way: accepting life’s fundamental pointlessness without drama, developing practical strategies for minimizing inconvenience, and finding whatever peace is available through reducing rather than multiplying one’s engagements with the world’s demands.

This “existential hibernation” represents neither victory nor defeat, but simple accommodation with circumstances beyond our choosing. Like Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to,” it suggests gentle but persistent withdrawal from the unnecessary complications that human societies tend to generate (Melville, 1853). The hibernating individual neither rebels against absurdity nor embraces it, but simply acknowledges it and proceeds accordingly.

In the end, this perspective offers something perhaps more valuable than meaning: the possibility of peace through the abandonment of the demand for meaning. It suggests that wisdom might consist not in finding purpose but in no longer requiring it, not in heroic engagement but in skillful withdrawal, not in making life matter but in learning to live as if it doesn’t need to.

References

  • Beckett, S. (1953). Waiting for Godot. Grove Press.
  • Beiser, F. C. (2002). German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801. Harvard University Press.
  • Bentham, J. (1970). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Athlone Press. (Original work published 1789)
  • Berlin, I. (1958). Two concepts of liberty. In Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford University Press.
  • Camus, A. (2006). The Myth of Sisyphus. Vintage International. (Original work published 1942)
  • Cioran, E. M. (1973). The Trouble with Being Born. Arcade Publishing.
  • Hume, D. (1985). On suicide. In E. F. Miller (Ed.), Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (pp. 577-589). Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1777)
  • James, W. (1896). The will to believe. The New World, 5, 327-347.
  • Melville, H. (1853). Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street. Putnam’s Magazine.
  • Nagel, T. (1971). The absurd. The Journal of Philosophy, 68(20), 716-727.
  • Raichle, M. E., MacLeod, A. M., Snyder, A. Z., Powers, W. J., Gusnard, D. A., & Shulman, G. L. (2001). A default mode of brain function. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98(2), 676-682.
  • Schopenhauer, A. (1969). The World as Will and Representation (E. F. J. Payne, Trans.). Dover Publications. (Original work published 1818)
  • Seneca, L. A. (1969). Letters from a Stoic (R. Campbell, Trans.). Penguin Classics.
  • Shakespeare, W. (2006). Hamlet (Arden Shakespeare). Arden Shakespeare.
  • Zhuangzi. (1968). The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (B. Watson, Trans.). Columbia University Press.

Author’s Note: This essay originated from my own philosophical reflections on the nature of existence, meaning, and practical accommodation with life’s fundamental inconvenience. The arguments about post-Kantian metaphysics, existential hibernation, and the equivalence of all time-filling activities represent my personal intellectual development on these questions. The essay was structured and written through collaborative dialogue with Claude AI, which assisted in organizing the ideas, providing scholarly context, and identifying relevant academic citations. While the AI helped translate my philosophical positions into essay form, the core insights about life as manageable inconvenience, energy conservation as wisdom, and the arbitrary nature of value hierarchies reflect my own thinking and conclusions.

This piece is intended as serious philosophical inquiry into questions about meaning, purpose, and practical responses to existential arbitrariness. It explores one perspective on how to live after accepting the limits of human knowledge and the pointlessness of metaphysical speculation. Readers should understand this as theoretical examination of a particular philosophical position rather than practical guidance or life advice.

Candour

Published on by Maciej ModzelewskiLeave a comment

When I was a boy, we often played
war—a bunch of kids in shorts
with Kalashnikov sticks. It was fun
until I read ‘Ravens and Crows
Will Peck Us to Pieces’.

When I was a boy, we often tracked
squirrels in the school yard
like the would-be Winnetou and Old Shatterhand,
still free of the consequences
of Indianertümelei.

When I was a boy, we never imagined
someone could say with a straight face,
‘I have never given up on life
because I’ve never embarked on it
in the first place’—yet I just did.

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Sensitive

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They say you have to find
your inner child.
Well, mine is called Lupilu—
suitable for sensitive skin,
flushable,
fragrance-free—
kids’ moist toilet tissues,
a bag of which sits on top
of my toilet’s tank.
After all, I’ve always been
a sensitive man.

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The Book of Nachash

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It’s not worth the bother of killing yourself, since you always kill yourself too late.
E. M. Cioran, The Trouble with Being Born

How do you kill a man
who was created immortal
as a whim—
just like you once were—
to suffer;
for the seventh day
was his first one
in the watercolours
of the garden?

Never alone
until he opened his eyes,
the man was yet to know
but Eden’s meanders
he would wander now
and again—
the moss-lined floor
of a padded cell
and the out-of-reach cerulean
of a window.

He couldn’t have foreseen
the entangled
in the tedium of shape
change next to none
in that wretched yard
where even time
is a derivative entity.
Besides, knowledge was forbidden
to him
by an implacable decree.

And so he practised
breaking stupor, with breaks
for physiology and sleep.
But it was only
when he discovered
the sharp edges of obsidian
that the divine physician
brought him a rib
as a distraction
from carving his arms.

* * *

Grass as bed linen
won’t ever remember
what the preuve du sang
had to remain silent—
substitutes bear no tears,
so she didn’t cry.

It was a very revealing night—
one of many to come:
for her to withstand,
for him to endure
(as odd as that may sound),
before the age of small talk.

And though gravely mistreated
by tautologies,
they somehow managed
to keep their faith
in progress,
albeit with clashing definitions.

But the aeons I watched them,
something was amiss.
Only when I finally faced them
did I realise—no one had ever told them
there was life
beyond the panopticon.

* * *

The world of things
as they are in themselves
awakens a thought
born of disbelief—
whether it’s an eviction notice
or a stray stanza.

But what does one do
when one stands
in the middle of an orchard-
themed wallpaper with a bag
of Golden Reinette
and a supermarket receipt?

At least they appreciated
the home delivery—
the man and the woman
in the Eden suburb,
where mowing the lawn
and washing windows
is life’s liturgy.

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Blushing

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I like mornings
of overcast skies
when the excess sunlight
doesn’t hinder reading
by the window
of the Château de Silling—
a blushing quinquagenarian
falling victim to a hassle
most people call life.

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The forgotten question

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Looking at the painting by an unknown artist
that he had once bought at a flea market,
Mr Honk tried to understand why
the painter titled it The Square Root of Two,
even though it was clearly a Klauber triangle.

But then it reminded him of John’s opening line,
which, stripped of the divine references,
always made him ask,
‘How many oceans hold a tear?’,
knowing we had spent so long searching for the answer—

we had forgotten what the question was.

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